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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Four years after calling for structural and conceptual
changes, Raúl Castro finally unveiled a roadmap of
substantive economic reforms. Over the next 18 months, at
least a million workers will be laid off from the bloated state
sector. Alternative forms of earning a living —selfemployment, cooperatives, leasing of land or physical space,
among others— are being authorized as old constraints on
these alternatives are rescinded. From the perspective of
ordinary Cubans, these reforms —called an actualización, or
an update of the economic model— were long overdue. Yet,
in hindsight, the slow-paced process can be explained, not in
terms of the need for time to "identify" Cuba's economic
problems which have been known for decades, but by Raúl
Castro's emphasis on la institucionalidad, the need to
channel decision making through institutions. His brother
left a chaotic state apparatus which first needed mending
before an elite consensus on the reform package could be
forged. Cuba is entering a situation without precedent: this
package is likely to run its own course without the
Comandante (Fidel Castro) stopping it. By 2015, Cuban
society will probably look different than today, featuring
unprecedented inequality and living standards that are on the
rise.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 2007, Raúl Castro first spoke of "introducing
structural and conceptual changes."1 A year prior, Fidel
Castro‟s illness had temporarily put him at the helm. From
the start, Raúl emphasized la institucionalidad, the notion
that decision making flows through institutions. This was not
an earth-shaking proposition, but one that sent a clear signal:
the days of abrupt twists and turns were over. In February
2008, Raúl was formally inducted as the president of Cuba.
Subsequently, his government took small steps toward a
more sensible economic policy, such as paying off state
debts to agricultural cooperatives, leasing state-owned land
to peasants and cooperatives, allowing Cubans to purchase
consumer items such as computers and cellular phones with
convertible pesos (CUCs), permitting Cubans with CUCs to
stay at hotels and shop in supermarkets previously reserved
for foreigners, and raising wages and even lifting wage
ceilings if warranted by the rise of productivity. More
significant were the pilot programs launched in Havana in
early 2010: many beauty and barber shops were turned into
worker-run cooperatives that would be subject to monthly
taxes, and some taxi drivers were authorized to use their
vehicles for their own gain as long as taxes were paid and the
cars properly maintained.2 In early April, Raúl Castro told
the delegates at the Communist Youth congress that the state
sector employed an excess of more than a million workers,
whom, he implied, would soon need to find employment
elsewhere.3

1

Raúl Castro, "Trabajar con sentido crítico y creador, sin anquilosamiento ni
esquematismos," Granma, July 27, 2007, http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu.
2
Mauricio Vicent, "Cuba debe despedir a un millón de empleados estatales," El
País, May 1, 2010, http://www.elpais.com.
3
Raúl Castro, "Sin una economía sólida y dinámica, sin eliminar gastos
superfluos y el derroche, no se podrá avanzar en la elevación del nivel de vida de
la población," Granma, April 5, 2010.
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THE EMPHASIS ON INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Most of the initial reforms were of no consequence for the
ailing Cuban economy. Incipient agricultural reforms —from
paying off state debts, leasing idle lands, and opening stores
that sell tools to peasants and cooperatives in CUCs, to
empowering municipal offices of the Ministry of Agriculture
to make decisions— did, however, suggest official intentions
to address the economy's fundamental problems. Cuban
agriculture had languished for decades, picking up somewhat
during the brief liberalization of the early 1980s and then
again in the mid-1990s. Afterwards overall reforms
stagnated until the Comandante retrenched them in 20022003.
Between 2001 and 2008, Cuba imported about $2.6 billion in
food from the United States.4 At the same time, up to fifty
percent of the island's arable lands lay fallow. Since
September 2008, the government has been leasing land to
peasants and cooperatives in a process that has let slightly
more than a million hectares; nonetheless, only 46 percent of
it is under cultivation or in cattle farms.5 While about
800,000 hectares still await the slow-moving leasing
procedures, the lands will not yield higher output, nor will
productivity increase, without peasants and cooperatives
having regular access to credit and inputs such as tools and
machinery, or without understanding the fiscal and socialsecurity contributions that they will soon be expected to
make. Cuba lacks the resources to continue importing food
from the United States at the 2001-2008 pace. Yet, to spur
domestic food production, the government must grapple with
more than just leasing idle lands.

4

U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, “Economic Eye on Cuba,” May 2009,
http://www.cubatrade.org/CubaExportStats.pdf.
5
Dora Pérez Sáez, "Mayoría de usufructuarios de tierras son jóvenes," Juventud
Rebelde, August 19, 2010, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/cuba/2010-0819/mayoria-de-usufructuarios-de-tierras-son-jovenes/.
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"We must forever banish the idea that Cuba be the only
country in the world where people can live without
working," Raúl Castro told the National Assembly of
Popular Power on August 1, 2010.6 No one who read that
speech carefully could have been surprised at the statement
issued by the Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions
(CTC), published on September 13, 2010 by all media
outlets on the island.7 Yet, there was a certain state of
disbelief that reforms of substance —Havana prefers to call
them an actualización, or an update, of the Cuban economic
model— had finally seen the light of day. The CTC's
pronunciamiento, or statement, outlined what lies in store for
ordinary Cubans:


By the end of March 2011, no less than 500,000
workers in the bloated state sector will be laid off. By
the end of 2011, almost 400,000 citizens will be selfemployed, meaning that 250,000 will join the under
150,000 who are already in the ranks.8



Workers who are laid off will receive their salaries
for up to a year. (This is a change from previous
policy which allowed displaced workers to be paid
their salaries without an end date or to study while
receiving their wages.)



Alternative sources of employment such as
cooperatives and self-employment will absorb
hundreds of thousands (in fact, more than a million
when all excess workers are laid off). Almost all

6

Raúl Castro, "Hemos adoptado importantes decisiones que constituyen en sí
mismas un cambio estructural y de concepto," Granma, August 2, 2010.
7
Pronunciamiento de la Central de Trabajadores de Cuba, Granma, September
13, 2010.
8
Información sobre el reordenamiento de la fuerza de trabajo,
http://www.penultimosdias.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/info-sobrereordenamiento-de-la-fuerza-de-trabajo.pdf. This document was obtained by a
foreign correspondent from a Cuban official.
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regulations that hindered self-employment are to be
rescinded.


The CTC echoed what Raúl Castro, the Economic
and Planning Minister Marino Murillo, and others
had been emphasizing: reduction of social
expenditures and the elimination of free services
(e.g., nursing homes for the elderly), excessive
subsidies (e.g., cutting back items such as cigarettes
and coffee from the ration book, la libreta), paying
laid-off workers to study, and early retirement. Rising
productivity, improving quality, and growing the
economy are marked as the new charges to save
Cuban socialism.



In both factories and offices, the CTC and the Cuban
Communist Party (PCC) must secure the
sociopolitical consensus needed to attain a successful
"updating" of the economic model.

By 2015, the economic model will be fully updated without
having frayed the social safety net that the revolution
established.
DO THEY GET IT?
As with the agricultural reforms launched in 2008, the
program outlined in the CTC statement depends on complex
factors:9

9
For more details, see: Leticia Martínez Hernández, "Mucho más que una
alternativa," Granma, September 24, 2010, which lists 178 activities now
authorized for self-employment. Proceso de reducción de plantillas, Ciudad de La
Habana, August 24, 2010 is a power point presentation obtained by the
Associated Press which takes the reader through the various steps the City of
Havana province will take to cut 134,248 jobs by the end of 2011.
http://www.penultimosdias.com/2010/09/14/la-reforma-que-viene/.
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Can the Cuban state mount a mini-IRS to collect
taxes, keep Cubans from underreporting, and
establish a social-security fund? Do Raúl Castro and
his cohorts understand that excessive taxes —which
could add up to 60-70 percent of profits— will
stymie the reforms?



Can the Cuban banking system sooner rather than
later provide the loans people will need for selfemployment and cooperatives? Do Raúl Castro and
his cohorts understand that taking out loans and
paying them back with interest will take ordinary
Cubans into unfamiliar territory?



Should ordinary Cubans trust the recently announced
"update" of the economic model? How long will
citizens who have been earning their living in the
black market wait until they come in from the cold,
indeed, if they ever do? Do Raúl Castro and his
cohorts understand that their credibility is badly
mauled given how erratic economic policies have
been over decades?



How will those laid off deal with their unprecedented
situation? Will most embrace entrepreneurship, pay
their taxes, and abide by the law? Probably not.
Many, perhaps a majority of those displaced, will be
stunned, or are already frightened at the prospect.10
Cubans are not used to paying taxes and breaking the
law has been a daily necessity.



Can the Cuban state respond to the announced
measures with flexibility and finesse? Do Raúl Castro
and his colleagues understand that their usual heavyhandedness will not only undermine the "update"

10

Maurico Vicent, "Los cubanos temen el ajuste de Castro," El País, September
28, 2010.
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plans but reinforce in ordinary Cubans their ingrained
mistrust of government economic policies?


While workers in France go on strike to protest
pension reforms, and the police in Ecuador riot to
defend their full benefits, there are no similar
experiences in Cuba. Whatever workers are saying in
the union meetings now being held, do Raúl Castro
and his cohorts understand that ideological
proclamations will not get them very far? In short, do
Cuba's senior leaders understand that —no matter the
rhetoric about social justice— they have opened the
door to a new social contract? By 2015, a reformed
economic model will have crafted a society marked
by a degree of inequality unseen since the 1950s.

AT A CROSSROAD?
In August 2009, Raúl Castro told the National Assembly that
"identifying our principal problems will take us some more
time" and, thus, the PCC Congress would be postponed.11
Though Cuba's principal economic problems have been
known for decades, the Comandante always derailed the
efforts to address them. Not this time. Perhaps he delayed the
process behind the scenes. But, the fact is that Raúl had his
own reasons for slowing the pace: he is conservative. For
example, rather than appointing a younger leader as his first
vice president of the Council of State and the Council of
Ministers in 2008, Raúl chose José Ramón Machado
Ventura, his closest ally since the 1950s. Although Mikhail
Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping are often suggested as
models to follow, Raúl's prototypes might be better found in
an earlier Soviet pair. After Leonid Brezhnev's passing, two
old men —first the more open-minded Yuri Andropov, then
the mummified Konstantin Chernenko— ruled the Soviet
11

Raúl Castro, "Tiene que ser el pueblo, con su Partido a la vanguardia, el que
decida," Granma, August 1, 2009.
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Union. Not until 1985 did the youthful Gorbachev take the
reins of the Kremlin. Is Raúl more akin to Andropov than to
Chernenko? Had he lived, Andropov —Gorbachev's
mentor— might have launched his own economic reforms,
though probably not glasnost. By laying out the first trek of
an economic roadmap (2010-2015) which the Cuban people
and the rest of the world have now been informed of, Raúl is
indeed more like Andropov. Perhaps the PCC will finally
hold its congress at the end of 2011, fourteen years since the
last one in 1997; a lapse that has likely irked Raúl, whose
leadership depends on institutions. The slow pace of getting
to the September CTC statement might also be understood in
terms of the institutional chaos that the Comandante left
behind. Raúl and his cohorts needed time to restore la
institucionalidad that would help them forge a consensus on
how to bolster the long failing economy. In retrospect, we
might well see this moment as a crossroad: for the first time,
the Cuban government laid out economic policies that played
themselves out, without anyone cutting them short. Along
the way, maybe Raúl Castro and the other senior leaders,
though more likely the next generation, will see the wisdom
of Deng Xiaoping's maxim: “It doesn‟t matter whether the
cat is black or white, as long as it can catch mice.” Cuba
would still be a dictatorship, but one in which the leadership
finally put the living standards of ordinary Cubans at the
heart of their rule.
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